Unsavory allies and strategic “blow-back:” Parallels in Pakistani and American Experience

Daniel Markey, Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations authored an interesting “contingency planning memo” analyzing the risks of another Mumbai-style terrorist attack against an Indian target by a Pakistani terrorist organization.

Markey judges the risk of a new attack significant and warns that the consequences for US counter terror and regional security interests would be severe.  He prescribes a number of practical measures that the US Government could undertake to lessen the chance and consequence of a new attack.  He takes pains to note the importance of giving the Indian Government non-military methods of expressing its outrage in a post-attack political climate.

After reading Markey’s memo, you can’t help but see the similarities between the Pakistani predicament in the Kashmiri region and the American predicament in Afghanistan.  The Pakistanis trained and supported a network of terrorist and paramilitary organizations to wage a proxy guerilla war for control of Kashmir.  Years later, those same groups operate beyond the bounds of governmental control and now pose a mortal threat to Pakistan’s security.  Lashkar-E-Taiba or any number of organizations could precipitate a regional conflagration without the knowledge or approval of Pakistani officials.  Similarly, American support for the Afghan mujahadeen during the Soviet-Afghan war resulted in strategic blow-back in the form of a global Islamist terrorist campaign.

One wonders if other states keen to wage paramilitary operations through proxies — most notably, Iran — will factor the American and Pakistani experiences into their decision-making.  As the long-term strategic consequences of allying with unsavory organizations grow in lock-step with their ever-more impressive capabilities, one would hope that state leaders will think twice, for their sake and ours.

Social Network Analysis and the Capture of Saddam Hussein

Slate is running an interesting five-part series on the capture of Saddam Hussein in post-invasion Iraq.  Journalist Chris Wilson argues that social network analysis was the key to Saddam’s apprehension and provides a lengthy, well-researched narrative to back it up.

Two interesting conclusions struck me upon reading the first three installments of the piece.  First, it seems that one of the principal obstacles to the US pursuit of Hussein was the assumption that he would rely on high-ranking former regime officials to maintain his security post-invasion.  In fact, he eschewed contact with most of those he had surrounded himself with in the years before the invasion for reasons of operational security.  Instead, he chose to rely on a cadre of relatively anonymous, predominantly-Tikriti bodyguards (numbering about 40) to manage the insurgency and keep him out of American hands.

Second, Wilson’s narrative demonstrates the utility of routine interrogation against even the most uncooperative suspects.  Maddox, a US interrogator, relates how suspects would inadvertently divulge valuable information in their efforts to protect what they thought was more important information:

In piecing together a trail through his network, Maddox says detainees often simply told him what he wanted to know. “They’re not going to tell me about the insurgency,” he explained. “But they’ll talk about who’s drinking buddies with who.” In thinking that they were deflecting the interrogators, lower-level operators were in fact leading Maddox closer to his target. These detainees, in a way, were making precisely the same mistake that the American military made at the start of the Iraq war. Institutional information about the insurgency wouldn’t bring coalition troops closer to Saddam’s hiding place. The social information that these lower-level Musslits provided was much more valuable. Maddox wanted to know the names of Saddam’s friends, not his former colleagues.

Wilson’s implicit endorsement of social network analysis as a method of combating insurgencies is well-received.  However, his piece also demonstrates the overwhelming weakness of this analytic technique: it requires a tremendous amount of high-quality information inputs.  Furthermore, it is rarely apparent when you have “enough” good information to assign high-confidence to the conclusions arising out of a network analysis.  As Wilson makes abundantly clear, in the case of Iraq, this information could only be gleaned through a series of risky raids.

Standing-up a virtual 911 system in Haiti: Ushahidi

Patrick Meier, the leader of Ushahidi’s Haiti crisis mapping project, has posted a detailed explanation of his team’s crisis mapping capability.

The functionality of the Ushahidi platform is pretty breath-taking.  In effect, Ushahidi stood up a “911″ emergency response system in a country that has never really had one.  This alone is a staggering feat.  But when you consider that this was accomplished in the wake of a horrific earthquake and was orchestrated from thousands of miles away, it is all the more impressive.

This type of innovation–borne in the harshest circumstances–could eventually change the way mature 911 systems do business on an everyday basis.

Why succession struggles are bad for the Taliban

This week’s capture of the Afghan Taliban Commander Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar in Karachi has been hailed as a leading indicator of a new Pakistani willingness to take on the violent extremists within its borders.   There seems to be a cautiously optimistic sense here in the US that this is the case.

The English language Pakistani press is quick to echo America’s most optimistic assessments.

The Washington Post quoted US officials and anti-terrorism experts as suggesting that Pakistan’s cooperation in the effort to capture Mullah Baradar “could prove a turning point in the Afghanistan war”.

The Indian press is less charitable:

Regional experts are already suggesting that the story is just a cover for Pakistan facilitating US contacts with the Taliban or interposing itself in US-Taliban engagement. Pakistani intelligence agencies have known his whereabouts for a long time, according to Taliban expert Ahmed Rashid.  Others are suggesting that the military-ISI combine has “sacrificed” Baradar to the Americans to win Washington’s trust and secure for itself a role in Afghanistan.

Either way, the US has struck a significant blow to the Afghan Taliban insurgency.  Baradar was a savvy leader who appreciated the finer points of COIN.  His loss will likely result in infighting and disorganization in the Taliban insurgency in the immediate short-term.  In the long term, the loss of his strategic guidance will degrade the Taliban in important ways.  Specifically, the risk of the Taliban over-playing its hand, much like al-Qaeda in Iraq did in Anbar a few years ago, has just increased significantly.

In the medium term ( three to six months), I would expect the insurgency to grow more fractious, violent, and hardcore.  Baradar was a relative moderate who might have been more open to a negotiated settlement than most of his prospective replacements.

The process of succession in terrorist and insurgent organizations can be messy and drawn out.  Historically, it has tended to result in a “race to the bottom” where prospective leaders attempt to prove their mettle by increasing the audacity, lethality, and tempo of their operations.  The new leader of the Afghan Taliban, regardless of who he is, will be shaped by organizational imperative to be exceedingly violent and uncompromising.  Paradoxically, this might be a good thing for those anticipating the Taliban’s demise.

Outflanking the Euro-skeptics?

It’s tempting to view the recent travails of the Euro zone as vindication of the Euro-skeptics’ dire warnings about the dangers of monetary and political union.  In fact, the Euro-skeptics may have little more than a pyrrhic victory to celebrate.

Paul Krugman penned an interesting analysis of the dynamics of the EU’s monetary union this morning in the NYT.  In essence, he argues that the EU was not ready for monetary union in 2002 because it lacked the necessary degree of political integration.  Simply put, monetary union without meaningful fiscal coordination is a recipe for disaster.  Crucially, however, he argues that winding back the clock and re-introducing national currencies is entirely infeasible.

The proponents of EU integration have either deliberately or unwittingly disabled the reverse gear in the EU’s integration process.  Instead of retarding integration as they did in the past, monetary and economic crises now highlight the urgency of further political integration.

The EU is gradually approaching a tipping-point as the inter-dependencies criss-crossing its member states multiply and increase dramatically in importance.  If unwinding these inter-dependencies really isn’t an option, then only two options remain:  the status quo or a stronger union.  Unfortunately for the economic aspirations of most Europeans, resurgent nationalism and the abysmally low esteem with which many Europeans hold the EU bureaucracy make it likely that Europe will continue to muddle through until things get worse still.

The Big Lebowski visits North Korea

"The Dude" is unimpressed.

VBS Tv, an independent new media operation, recently gained access to North Korea for a bizarre visit and posted videos on their site.  CNN highlighted their work yesterday.  Much of what their film crew experienced was reminiscent of the dog and pony show that Madeleine Albright was treated to on her visit as Secretary of State in 2000.  The twist here is that the VBS reporter bears a startling resemblance to the Big Lebowski in both appearance and affect.  I could not think of a better traveling companion for a trip  like this…

The High-value Detainee Interrogation Group – the wave of the future?

The Obama Administration is moving quickly now to stand-up a unit that it has been cultivating since last summer — the High-value Detainee Interrogation Group (HIG).  The HIG is variously described as an interagency team of “elite” interrogators which is tasked to conduct interrogations of the most prominent and problematic civil-combatant suspects.  The HIG is designed to strike a dynamic, case-by-case balance in the government’s efforts to glean intelligence to prevent future attacks and preserve unassailable civil cases against terrorism suspects.

The establishment of the HIG is, however, also indicative of two broader trends worth noting.  First, it is yet another example of the need of the Executive Office of the President to manage tight control over operations that used to be managed by government departments and cabinet officials.  Since the Kennedy Administration first opened the now famous “Situation Room” in the White House basement in 1961, the presidency has increasingly perceived the need to manage crises and delicate matters at the highest levels of government.  This is in large part due to the strategic importance of what used to be tactical concerns.  In an age of 24 hour global media and the unblinking eye of the internet, even the most local decision can have geo-political consequences.

Second, the HIG is  symptomatic of the increasingly complex and multi-disciplinary challenges facing national security agencies.  The security challenges that used to be compartmentalized and managed by distinct agencies now require the collaboration of a variety of officials from across the interagency.  The HIG is managed by the National Security Council and draws participants from the FBI, CIA, and State Department.  Each of these agencies and departments contributes something that none of the other agencies can replicate.  It is becoming clear that coordination is so often necessary but rarely sufficient.  Routine, systemic collaboration appears to be the only work-able solution to the transnational and multi-disciplinary threats that pervade the international security environment today.

Al Qaeda Dropouts

Foreign Policy posts an interesting piece on the phenomenon of al-Qaeda dropouts.  The author, Michael Jacobson, was on the staff of the 9/11 Commission and relates the stories of three al-Qaeda members who were slated to partake in the 9/11 attacks but had second thoughts (two of the three actually declined to participate in the end).  Although the concept of studying the reasons why terrorist groups decline is not as new as the author seems to think, it is a useful reminder of the decisive role that social relationships play in both radicalization and de-radicalization.

While it is true that radicalizing individuals often descend into a sort of self-imposed isolation or experience an externally-imposed alienation, it would be a mistake to believe that radicalization is a solitary process.  In fact, it is this acute sense of loneliness that makes potential extremists all the more susceptible to the peer pressures of those few whom they do interact with.

The case of one of the 9/11 pilots who was contemplating withdrawal from the 9/11 attacks demonstrates how social relationships can be leveraged to maintain an extremist’s radicalized mindset.  Jacobson writes that:

In the summer of 2001, al Qaeda confronted an even larger potential challenge to the operation when Ziad Jarrah, who went on to pilot Flight 93, was deliberating about whether to withdraw from the operation, in part because of Jarrah’s “troubled” relationship with Atta. In what was an “emotional conversation,” according to the 9/11 Commission, Ramzi Binalshibh — the Hamburg-based liaison between the cell and the al Qaeda leadership — was able to persuade Jarrah to stay the course.

A second case, also from the 9/11 attacks, shows how a countervailing set of social relations — familial relations– can unwind the radicalization process.  Again, Jacobson relates that:

After getting his visa, Hamlan contacted his family despite clear instructions not to do so by his al Qaeda handlers. When Hamlan found out that his mother was ill, he decided not to return to Afghanistan — even in the face of repeated follow-up pressure by al Qaeda….Rashid’s story might illustrate even more dramatically the role that family can play in the dropout process. According to KSM, Rashid may have bailed on the plot because his family found out about his involvement in it and confiscated his passport.

These reminders are particularly poignant in light of this week’s developments in the Christmas day bomber case.  If we are to meaningfully reduce the threat of Islamist terrorism, we will need to enlist the support of the families and peers of those whom al Qaeda and its associated movements target for radicalization.

Making terrorists talk – the FBI way

A few weeks ago I argued (here and here) that the Obama Administration was right to prosecute the “Christmas Day Bomber” in the criminal justice system.  Since then, the issue has become a major vulnerability for the Obama Administration and even emerged as a hot-button issue in Scott Brown’s successful campaign for Senate (“We shouldn’t be defending terrorists, we should be defeating them!“).

Early reports suggesting that the suspect, Abdulmutallab, was no longer cooperating with authorities after he was read his Miranda rights threw fuel on the fire.  However, Congressional testimony by the Director of National Intelligence and Director of the FBI has brought the truth to light.

It turns out that Abdulmutallab is not only talking, he’s cooperating fully.  What’s more, there is reason to believe that his cooperation is a direct result of the U.S. Government’s decision to turn his case over to the FBI and Department of Justice.  Specifically, the FBI was able to secure the cooperation of Abdulmutallab’s family; at least two family members flew to the U.S. to convince the suspect to speak truthfully with authorities.  As a result, the U.S. has secured a significant amount of far more reliable intelligence than it ever could have hoped to acquire via alternative means.

Lastly, it’s important to recognize that this was not an isolated case.  The NYU Report Card on Terrorist Prosecutions cites other examples of the DoJ’s success convincing terrorists to cooperate:

Three  notable examples of cooperators are Iyman Faris, whose cooperation may have ultimately led to six other high-level prosecutions; Mohammed Mansour Jabarah, who provided details on al Qaeda training camps and methods; and Bryant Neal Vinas, who reportedly began cooperating immediately upon arrest, providing information leading to overseas prosecutions and domestic alerts.

Those making the easy “tough on terror” argument in favor of aggressive interrogation and non-traditional prosecutions of terror suspects are on the wrong side of the evidence.  The burden of proof is now on them to demonstrate that alternative means of handling terror suspects are a better solution… and their case is looking weaker and weaker.

UPDATE:  The DoJ released a fascinating five-page defense of the criminal prosecution of Abdulmutallab earlier today.  One key point followed by a lengthier excerpt follows:

In fact, there is no court-approved system currently in place in which suspected terrorists captured inside the United States can be detained and held without access to an attorney; nor is there any known mechanism to persuade an uncooperative individual to talk to the government that has been proven more effective than the criminal justice system.

…many defendants will talk and cooperate with law enforcement agents after being informed of their right to remain silent and to consult with an attorney. Examples include L’Houssaine Kherchtou, who was advised of his Miranda rights, cooperated with the government and provided critical intelligence on al-Qaeda, including their interest in using piloted planes as suicide bombers, and Nuradin Abdi, who provided significant information after being repeatedly advised of his Miranda rights over a two week period. During an international terrorism investigation regarding Operation Crevice, law enforcement agents gained valuable intelligence regarding al-Qaeda military commanders and suspects involved in bombing plots in the U.K. from a defendant who agreed to cooperate after being advised of, and waiving his Miranda rights. Other terrorism subjects cooperate voluntarily with law enforcement without the need to provide Miranda warnings because of the non-custodial nature of the interview or cooperate after their arrest and agree to debriefings in the presence of their attorneys. Many of these subjects have provided vital intelligence on al-Qaeda, including several members of the Lackawanna Six, described above, who were arrested and provided information about the Al Farooq training camp in Afghanistan; and Mohammad Warsame, who voluntarily submitted to interviews with the FBI and provided intelligence on his contacts with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. There are other examples which I am happy to provide upon request. There are currently other terrorism suspects who have cooperated and are providing valuable intelligence information whose identities cannot be publicly disclosed.

Finding a way to get more than we can pay for – national security and the budget crunch

The Times sounds the alarm over the implications of the latest budget forecasts which predict sustained (but unsustainable) budget deficits over the next ten years.  The Times rightfully focuses on the domestic implications of this budget crunch.  But what does it mean for American national security?

In the short-term – not much.  In fact, national security expenditures are exempt from Obama’s “budget freeze” and the Pentagon base budget was increased to $549 billion with an additional $159 billion to fund the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.  In truth, the DoD budget had to expand simply to pay for foreign policy decisions we’ve already made (e.g. ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, etc.).  In future years, however, we will be making some harder choices.

The prolonged debate over the future of the war in Afghanistan is likely emblematic of what future national security policy debates are going to look like.  The traditional considerations about use of force will retain their centrality – Is a vital interest at stake?  Is war a last resort?  Can force be used discriminately?  Are the means proportional to the ends?  Can we succeed?  But new questions will become increasingly important – Can we afford to intervene?  What won’t we be able to do elsewhere if we commit to a certain course of action in a given theater?  etc.

Over the course of the 20th century, the US was largely able to avoid these difficult tradeoffs.  As a result, American military forces effectively under-wrote global security all around the world both unilaterally, bilaterally (e.g. U.S. – Japan security alliance), and multilaterally (e.g. NATO).

All indications are, however, that the 21st century will be defined by “persistent conflict.“  In addition to countering rogue regimes like North Korea and Iran, the U.S. will need to devote resources to address the threats posed by failed states and insurgents and terrorists.

The U.S. cannot continue to provide global security in the same manner it always has – the resources available for national security expenditures are decreasing while the resource demands of the world’s competing threats are expanding.  Clearly, the U.S. will need to reevaluate the way it secures its interests.  In the future, we will need to rely more on bilateral and multilateral security solutions.  Whenever possible, we can and should facilitate regionally-led operations.

This is not to suggest that the U.S. should cede its security to other powers.  We should never do that.  Instead, we should recognize that the world has changed — countries everywhere have something to lose when regional threats go systemic.  It’s high time that we lead other countries in an effort to share this growing burden.