Making terrorists talk – the FBI way

A few weeks ago I argued (here and here) that the Obama Administration was right to prosecute the “Christmas Day Bomber” in the criminal justice system.  Since then, the issue has become a major vulnerability for the Obama Administration and even emerged as a hot-button issue in Scott Brown’s successful campaign for Senate (“We shouldn’t be defending terrorists, we should be defeating them!“).

Early reports suggesting that the suspect, Abdulmutallab, was no longer cooperating with authorities after he was read his Miranda rights threw fuel on the fire.  However, Congressional testimony by the Director of National Intelligence and Director of the FBI has brought the truth to light.

It turns out that Abdulmutallab is not only talking, he’s cooperating fully.  What’s more, there is reason to believe that his cooperation is a direct result of the U.S. Government’s decision to turn his case over to the FBI and Department of Justice.  Specifically, the FBI was able to secure the cooperation of Abdulmutallab’s family; at least two family members flew to the U.S. to convince the suspect to speak truthfully with authorities.  As a result, the U.S. has secured a significant amount of far more reliable intelligence than it ever could have hoped to acquire via alternative means.

Lastly, it’s important to recognize that this was not an isolated case.  The NYU Report Card on Terrorist Prosecutions cites other examples of the DoJ’s success convincing terrorists to cooperate:

Three  notable examples of cooperators are Iyman Faris, whose cooperation may have ultimately led to six other high-level prosecutions; Mohammed Mansour Jabarah, who provided details on al Qaeda training camps and methods; and Bryant Neal Vinas, who reportedly began cooperating immediately upon arrest, providing information leading to overseas prosecutions and domestic alerts.

Those making the easy “tough on terror” argument in favor of aggressive interrogation and non-traditional prosecutions of terror suspects are on the wrong side of the evidence.  The burden of proof is now on them to demonstrate that alternative means of handling terror suspects are a better solution… and their case is looking weaker and weaker.

UPDATE:  The DoJ released a fascinating five-page defense of the criminal prosecution of Abdulmutallab earlier today.  One key point followed by a lengthier excerpt follows:

In fact, there is no court-approved system currently in place in which suspected terrorists captured inside the United States can be detained and held without access to an attorney; nor is there any known mechanism to persuade an uncooperative individual to talk to the government that has been proven more effective than the criminal justice system.

…many defendants will talk and cooperate with law enforcement agents after being informed of their right to remain silent and to consult with an attorney. Examples include L’Houssaine Kherchtou, who was advised of his Miranda rights, cooperated with the government and provided critical intelligence on al-Qaeda, including their interest in using piloted planes as suicide bombers, and Nuradin Abdi, who provided significant information after being repeatedly advised of his Miranda rights over a two week period. During an international terrorism investigation regarding Operation Crevice, law enforcement agents gained valuable intelligence regarding al-Qaeda military commanders and suspects involved in bombing plots in the U.K. from a defendant who agreed to cooperate after being advised of, and waiving his Miranda rights. Other terrorism subjects cooperate voluntarily with law enforcement without the need to provide Miranda warnings because of the non-custodial nature of the interview or cooperate after their arrest and agree to debriefings in the presence of their attorneys. Many of these subjects have provided vital intelligence on al-Qaeda, including several members of the Lackawanna Six, described above, who were arrested and provided information about the Al Farooq training camp in Afghanistan; and Mohammad Warsame, who voluntarily submitted to interviews with the FBI and provided intelligence on his contacts with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. There are other examples which I am happy to provide upon request. There are currently other terrorism suspects who have cooperated and are providing valuable intelligence information whose identities cannot be publicly disclosed.

Yemen – the next Afghanistan?

The attempted bombing of a Christmas-day flight into Detroit, Michigan, has rekindled a long-simmering debate about the stability of Yemen. It is widely reported that the suspect in the bombing case spent up to four months in Yemen and received technical assistance and direction during his time there. This incident has ratcheted up the rhetoric regarding Yemen to unprecedented levels. In fact, Joe Liebermann now believes that Yemen could be our “next Afghanistan.”

In truth, Yemen has always been a central theater in the running conflict between the U.S. and al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Yemen is Osama bin Laden’s ancestral homeland — his father came to Saudi Arabia from Yemen.  At the conclusion of the Soviet-Afghan war, Bin Laden and his associates briefly considered focusing their attention on Yemen before settling instead on chasing the U.S. out of Saudi Arabia first.  The port city of Aden was the site of the USS Cole bombing. In the past couple of years, the U.S. has launched a number of drone strikes against suspected al-Qaeda figures there– most recently targeting the inspirational figure implicated in the Fort Hood massacre.

So what is the US Government doing now about Yemen?

Central Command has maintained a task force over the past couple of years, Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa, working on at least two levels in Yemen. To address the short-term threat of Yemen serving as a terrorist safe haven, CENTCOM has fed the Yemenis intelligence and even mounted direct attacks against targets in Yemen. To manage the long-term threat of instability in Yemen, CENTCOM has coordinated a broader effort to build capacity and partner with the Yemeni Government.

So why do things appear to be getting worse in Yemen?

In short, Yemen continues to be a failed-state. It is not yet capable of precluding terrorist activity within its territory.  More optimistically, it’s conceivable that al-Qaeda is looking to shift more of its weight there as a result of U.S. security gains in Afghanistan and Iraq and the increasing pressure of Pakistani security forces in the Af-Pak border region.  In other words, it is not just that Yemen presents an attractive target in absolute terms, it is that Yemen is relatively more attractive than the alternatives.

The bottom line.

Over time, it is becoming increasingly apparent that insecurity anywhere contributes to insecurity everywhere. Progress in one theater will increase the likelihood of digression in weaker states elsewhere. The US and its allies must re-double efforts to improve the capability and legitimacy of failing governments the world over, but especially in those regions where al-Qaeda has social linkages and historical ties — Yemen, Somalia, and the Sudan are at the top of that list. CJTF-Horn of Africa has its work cut out for it.

UPDATE:  An excellent link on the same from epapadopoulos via Twitter – http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/dec/29/yemen-terror-failed-state