Al Qaeda Dropouts

Foreign Policy posts an interesting piece on the phenomenon of al-Qaeda dropouts.  The author, Michael Jacobson, was on the staff of the 9/11 Commission and relates the stories of three al-Qaeda members who were slated to partake in the 9/11 attacks but had second thoughts (two of the three actually declined to participate in the end).  Although the concept of studying the reasons why terrorist groups decline is not as new as the author seems to think, it is a useful reminder of the decisive role that social relationships play in both radicalization and de-radicalization.

While it is true that radicalizing individuals often descend into a sort of self-imposed isolation or experience an externally-imposed alienation, it would be a mistake to believe that radicalization is a solitary process.  In fact, it is this acute sense of loneliness that makes potential extremists all the more susceptible to the peer pressures of those few whom they do interact with.

The case of one of the 9/11 pilots who was contemplating withdrawal from the 9/11 attacks demonstrates how social relationships can be leveraged to maintain an extremist’s radicalized mindset.  Jacobson writes that:

In the summer of 2001, al Qaeda confronted an even larger potential challenge to the operation when Ziad Jarrah, who went on to pilot Flight 93, was deliberating about whether to withdraw from the operation, in part because of Jarrah’s “troubled” relationship with Atta. In what was an “emotional conversation,” according to the 9/11 Commission, Ramzi Binalshibh — the Hamburg-based liaison between the cell and the al Qaeda leadership — was able to persuade Jarrah to stay the course.

A second case, also from the 9/11 attacks, shows how a countervailing set of social relations — familial relations– can unwind the radicalization process.  Again, Jacobson relates that:

After getting his visa, Hamlan contacted his family despite clear instructions not to do so by his al Qaeda handlers. When Hamlan found out that his mother was ill, he decided not to return to Afghanistan — even in the face of repeated follow-up pressure by al Qaeda….Rashid’s story might illustrate even more dramatically the role that family can play in the dropout process. According to KSM, Rashid may have bailed on the plot because his family found out about his involvement in it and confiscated his passport.

These reminders are particularly poignant in light of this week’s developments in the Christmas day bomber case.  If we are to meaningfully reduce the threat of Islamist terrorism, we will need to enlist the support of the families and peers of those whom al Qaeda and its associated movements target for radicalization.

Making terrorists talk – the FBI way

A few weeks ago I argued (here and here) that the Obama Administration was right to prosecute the “Christmas Day Bomber” in the criminal justice system.  Since then, the issue has become a major vulnerability for the Obama Administration and even emerged as a hot-button issue in Scott Brown’s successful campaign for Senate (“We shouldn’t be defending terrorists, we should be defeating them!“).

Early reports suggesting that the suspect, Abdulmutallab, was no longer cooperating with authorities after he was read his Miranda rights threw fuel on the fire.  However, Congressional testimony by the Director of National Intelligence and Director of the FBI has brought the truth to light.

It turns out that Abdulmutallab is not only talking, he’s cooperating fully.  What’s more, there is reason to believe that his cooperation is a direct result of the U.S. Government’s decision to turn his case over to the FBI and Department of Justice.  Specifically, the FBI was able to secure the cooperation of Abdulmutallab’s family; at least two family members flew to the U.S. to convince the suspect to speak truthfully with authorities.  As a result, the U.S. has secured a significant amount of far more reliable intelligence than it ever could have hoped to acquire via alternative means.

Lastly, it’s important to recognize that this was not an isolated case.  The NYU Report Card on Terrorist Prosecutions cites other examples of the DoJ’s success convincing terrorists to cooperate:

Three  notable examples of cooperators are Iyman Faris, whose cooperation may have ultimately led to six other high-level prosecutions; Mohammed Mansour Jabarah, who provided details on al Qaeda training camps and methods; and Bryant Neal Vinas, who reportedly began cooperating immediately upon arrest, providing information leading to overseas prosecutions and domestic alerts.

Those making the easy “tough on terror” argument in favor of aggressive interrogation and non-traditional prosecutions of terror suspects are on the wrong side of the evidence.  The burden of proof is now on them to demonstrate that alternative means of handling terror suspects are a better solution… and their case is looking weaker and weaker.

UPDATE:  The DoJ released a fascinating five-page defense of the criminal prosecution of Abdulmutallab earlier today.  One key point followed by a lengthier excerpt follows:

In fact, there is no court-approved system currently in place in which suspected terrorists captured inside the United States can be detained and held without access to an attorney; nor is there any known mechanism to persuade an uncooperative individual to talk to the government that has been proven more effective than the criminal justice system.

…many defendants will talk and cooperate with law enforcement agents after being informed of their right to remain silent and to consult with an attorney. Examples include L’Houssaine Kherchtou, who was advised of his Miranda rights, cooperated with the government and provided critical intelligence on al-Qaeda, including their interest in using piloted planes as suicide bombers, and Nuradin Abdi, who provided significant information after being repeatedly advised of his Miranda rights over a two week period. During an international terrorism investigation regarding Operation Crevice, law enforcement agents gained valuable intelligence regarding al-Qaeda military commanders and suspects involved in bombing plots in the U.K. from a defendant who agreed to cooperate after being advised of, and waiving his Miranda rights. Other terrorism subjects cooperate voluntarily with law enforcement without the need to provide Miranda warnings because of the non-custodial nature of the interview or cooperate after their arrest and agree to debriefings in the presence of their attorneys. Many of these subjects have provided vital intelligence on al-Qaeda, including several members of the Lackawanna Six, described above, who were arrested and provided information about the Al Farooq training camp in Afghanistan; and Mohammad Warsame, who voluntarily submitted to interviews with the FBI and provided intelligence on his contacts with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. There are other examples which I am happy to provide upon request. There are currently other terrorism suspects who have cooperated and are providing valuable intelligence information whose identities cannot be publicly disclosed.

What to do with suspected terrorists…

A brief article I wrote on the prosecution of the Christmas Day bomber was recently published online by the American Constitution Society.  The big takeaway (spoiler-alert):

The problem of Islamist radicalization and al-Qaeda inspired terrorism is not going away anytime soon. As the events of the past few months demonstrate, the threats of homegrown and transnational terrorism are growing increasingly complex. The stop-gap measures of years past are no longer sufficient. For too long now, we have alienated the very people who are most essential to preventing terrorist attacks against America — the moderate Muslim community at home and abroad and friendly governments around the world. It’s time for the U.S. to get savvy about how it deals with suspected terrorists by engendering the respect, trust, and cooperation of the only people who can help us to prevail.

The rest of the article is available here.  At the end of the day, it’s clear that we need to reform how we handle terrorism suspects.  To suggest that they can all be managed in the same way is a non-starter.  Who they are, what they’ve done, where they operate, and how much they are likely to know about future operations must all be considered.  However, we do need to develop a logical framework to address these issues and execute justice in a more transparent way than we have in the past.

Hoffman’s About-face

In case you missed it, the NY Times Magazine ran a lengthy and insightful analysis of the Obama Administration’s approach to counter terrorism.  Yet, perhaps the most important section of the story had nothing to do with the Administration and everything to do with the evolution of the terrorist threat:

For all of the attention on the Nigerian underwear bomber, some experts say they believe the more insidious threat will be a new generation of homegrown extremists. In recent months, authorities have arrested a number of American residents, including Najibullah Zazi, an airport-shuttle driver who is suspected of plotting to attack New York after receiving training in Pakistan, and David Coleman Headley, a Pakistani-American accused of aiding terrorist attacks in Mumbai. There was the Fort Hood shooting rampage, as well as a group of Somali-Americans from Minnesota who reportedly wanted to fight in Somalia and five American Muslims from Virginia who traveled to Pakistan supposedly to join the jihad.

If they are the next wave, American extremists are going to be hard to track and stop. The Internet makes it possible for Al Qaeda and its allies to reach out from the dusty villages of Waziristan all the way to Illinois and Colorado. “Although no one wants to admit it, I think a watershed has been crossed in the terrorist threat in the United States,” Bruce Hoffman, a Georgetown University terrorism scholar, told me. “It’s way different than it was in the Bush years.”

The events of the last few months have made it clear that the radicalization problem in many parts of the world and, to an increasing degree here in the U.S., is growing more acute.  For Bruce Hoffman to acknowledge homegrown radicals as the next big thing is no small thing at all.  In fact, his choice of wording was even a bit ironic.   Hoffman argued much the opposite for years in a much-hyped debate with Marc Sageman regarding whether homegrown radicals or affiliated operatives presented the most significant threat to American security.   Clearly, it is not as feasible to keep the fight away from American shores as many had hoped.

“London-istan:” The UK has a serious radicalization problem. Do we?

As many analysts initially suspected, it now appears likely that the suspect in the attempted Christmas-bombing, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, became radicalized during his time in London.  This latest development underscores the severity of the radicalization problem present in the UK.  Furthermore, it demonstrates how a problem of social alienation and expatriate vulnerability in one western locale can have disastrous consequences on the other side of the Atlantic.

The good news is that although Abdulmutallab’s experience in London was a necessary part of his transformation into a terrorist, it was apparently not sufficient to prepare him to launch his attack.  Abdulmutallab appears to have received technical assistance and operational direction in Yemen, not London.  For years now, counterterrorism analysts have fretted over the possibility that individuals will be radicalized and trained to partake in “self-starter” operations via the internet.  This case would suggest that this scenario still remains the exception rather than the rule.

The most disquieting aspect of the radicalization problem for the U.S. is the growing realization that the U.S. is not immune to Islamist radicalization as many had initially hoped.  By most accounts, the radicalization problem in the U.S. is far less severe than that experienced in London specifically and Europe more generally.  Much of the academic research on radicalization suggests that the U.S. is simply better at integrating immigrants into society in ways that discourage radicalization.  However, the past two years have witnessed a growing incidence of self-radicalized cells in the U.S.  The Fort Hood massacre, the Fort Dix plot, and a host of FBI stings have revealed a radicalized fringe in the U.S.   More disheartening still, ABC News reported tonight that the radicalization process is now unfolding in under three years, far quicker than we have seen in previous cases.  Are things getting worse?   If so, why?