A few weeks ago I argued (here and here) that the Obama Administration was right to prosecute the “Christmas Day Bomber” in the criminal justice system. Since then, the issue has become a major vulnerability for the Obama Administration and even emerged as a hot-button issue in Scott Brown’s successful campaign for Senate (“We shouldn’t be defending terrorists, we should be defeating them!“).
Early reports suggesting that the suspect, Abdulmutallab, was no longer cooperating with authorities after he was read his Miranda rights threw fuel on the fire. However, Congressional testimony by the Director of National Intelligence and Director of the FBI has brought the truth to light.
It turns out that Abdulmutallab is not only talking, he’s cooperating fully. What’s more, there is reason to believe that his cooperation is a direct result of the U.S. Government’s decision to turn his case over to the FBI and Department of Justice. Specifically, the FBI was able to secure the cooperation of Abdulmutallab’s family; at least two family members flew to the U.S. to convince the suspect to speak truthfully with authorities. As a result, the U.S. has secured a significant amount of far more reliable intelligence than it ever could have hoped to acquire via alternative means.
Lastly, it’s important to recognize that this was not an isolated case. The NYU Report Card on Terrorist Prosecutions cites other examples of the DoJ’s success convincing terrorists to cooperate:
Three notable examples of cooperators are Iyman Faris, whose cooperation may have ultimately led to six other high-level prosecutions; Mohammed Mansour Jabarah, who provided details on al Qaeda training camps and methods; and Bryant Neal Vinas, who reportedly began cooperating immediately upon arrest, providing information leading to overseas prosecutions and domestic alerts.
Those making the easy “tough on terror” argument in favor of aggressive interrogation and non-traditional prosecutions of terror suspects are on the wrong side of the evidence. The burden of proof is now on them to demonstrate that alternative means of handling terror suspects are a better solution… and their case is looking weaker and weaker.
UPDATE: The DoJ released a fascinating five-page defense of the criminal prosecution of Abdulmutallab earlier today. One key point followed by a lengthier excerpt follows:
In fact, there is no court-approved system currently in place in which suspected terrorists captured inside the United States can be detained and held without access to an attorney; nor is there any known mechanism to persuade an uncooperative individual to talk to the government that has been proven more effective than the criminal justice system.
…many defendants will talk and cooperate with law enforcement agents after being informed of their right to remain silent and to consult with an attorney. Examples include L’Houssaine Kherchtou, who was advised of his Miranda rights, cooperated with the government and provided critical intelligence on al-Qaeda, including their interest in using piloted planes as suicide bombers, and Nuradin Abdi, who provided significant information after being repeatedly advised of his Miranda rights over a two week period. During an international terrorism investigation regarding Operation Crevice, law enforcement agents gained valuable intelligence regarding al-Qaeda military commanders and suspects involved in bombing plots in the U.K. from a defendant who agreed to cooperate after being advised of, and waiving his Miranda rights. Other terrorism subjects cooperate voluntarily with law enforcement without the need to provide Miranda warnings because of the non-custodial nature of the interview or cooperate after their arrest and agree to debriefings in the presence of their attorneys. Many of these subjects have provided vital intelligence on al-Qaeda, including several members of the Lackawanna Six, described above, who were arrested and provided information about the Al Farooq training camp in Afghanistan; and Mohammad Warsame, who voluntarily submitted to interviews with the FBI and provided intelligence on his contacts with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. There are other examples which I am happy to provide upon request. There are currently other terrorism suspects who have cooperated and are providing valuable intelligence information whose identities cannot be publicly disclosed.
